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HUGHES V. WASHINGTON: SOME FEDERAL COM-
MON LAW IN THE REAL PROPERTY AREA
ROBERT E. BECK*
I. THE PROBLEM
In Hughes v. Washington,' Mr. Justice Black speaking for the
United States Supreme Court put the question for decision as follows:
"whether federal or state law controls the ownership of land, called
accretion, gradually deposited by the ocean on adjoining upland
property conveyed by the United States prior to statehood. ' ' 2 The
answer that the court gave was that federal law controlled. Looking
at Justice Black's posit of the question, several factors are mentioned
that could have been decisive for the court. (1) Was it simply that
there was a federal conveyance? (2) Was it that "ownership," that
is "title," rather than some other issue was involved? (3) Was it
that accretion rather than some other issue was involved? (4) Was
it that an ocean, rather than an inland, boundary was involved? (5)
Was it that the conveyance was made prior to Washington statehood?
(6) Or was it a combination of one or more of the foregoing?
What makes the answers to these questions immediately of fun-
damental importance is the interpretation put upon the majority
opinion by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion. He clearly fo-
cuses on the existence of the "federal grant" as the necessary nexus
for the majority and points out what the ultimate conclusion will be
if that reasoning is accepted: "For if they [riparian owners deriv-
ing their title from the federal government] were [immune from
the changing of general state rules], then the property law of a
state like Washington, carved entirely out of federal territory, would
be forever frozen into the mold it occupied on the date of the State's
admission to the Union." s If such is indeed the import of the ma-
Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law, LL.B. University of
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1. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
2. 1d. at 290-91.
3. Id. at 295.
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jority opinion, it is, without doubt, of fundamental importance, in-
cluding to North Dakota.
4
Before going on to an analysis of the opinion, it is important to
bring out clearly that two major problems exist: (1) Is there a fed-
eral question? 5 (2) If so, what is the federal law? The federal law
under (2) could be to apply the rule of the state where the land is
located.6 The Court's answer in Hughes that federal law controlled
meant not only that there was a federal question but that state law
would be disregarded as to (2).
II. THE FACTS OF HUGHES
In 1859 the federal government completed a survey of the general
locality in question. The ocean meander line was, however, estab-
lished east of the tract now admittedly owned by plaintiff, Mrs.
Hughes. Plaintiff derived her title from predecessors whose patent
from the federal government predated statehood. Apparently all or
most7 of what is now plaintiff's property was formed by accretion
between 1859 and November 11, 1889, the date that Washington was
admitted to statehood. The State of Washington, as owner of the bed
where the alluvion formed, claimed all of the alluvion formed by ac-
cretion since its admission to the Union on November 11, 1889, be-
cause of a constitutional provision adopted at that time. The Supreme
Court of Washington in a 7-2 decision agreed with the State.8
4. "All the land within the state of North Dakota was within the public do-
main and title was only to be acquired from the United States of America."
Ruemmele, Title Evidencing in North Dakota, 43 N.D.L. REv. 467, 468 (1967).
5. The federal constitution provides in part:
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties .... "
U.S. Const. Art. III § 2. If a matter meets the "arising under"test, it is
said that a "federal question" exists.
In commenting upon the wide-open door regarding the interpretation of "aris-
ing under" in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824), Professor Wright observed: "But to hold that the 1875 statute gives
federal Jurisdiction whenever some element of federal law is an 'ingredient'
of the cause of action would mean, for example, that virtually every case
involving the title to land in the western states, where title descends from a
grant from the United States, could be litigated in federal court" (C.
WIGHT, FEDERAL COURTs 49-50 (1963), his clear implication being that this
would be an absurd result. See Act of March 3, 1875, Ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat.
470 concerning the original jurisdiction granted to federal courts of the
United States. Thus Professor Wright felt that the statute should be given
a more restrictive Interpretation than the Constitution. See also Act of Sept.
24, 1789, Ch. 20 § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81 that declares, "The Supreme Court shall
also have appelate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the sev-
eral States .... "
6. In some instances it has to be applied.
See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Ch. 20 § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 which provides that "the
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they may
apply."
See also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1945).
7. This is not clear from the facts. The 1859 survey meander line clearly was east
of what is now plaintiff's tract But how close the meander line was to the ocean water
is not clear.
8. Hughes v. Washington, 410 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1966). See also 11 ST. Lours U.L.J. 122
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In reversing the state court, the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Black, said that Borax, Consolidated
Ltd. v. Los Angeles9 pointed the way for decision. This is the prin-
cipal case relied upon by the majority and must, therefore, be an-
alyzed for its relevance and limits.
III. BORAX, CONSOLIDATED LTD. V. LOS ANGELES
A. The Black View of Borax
According to Mr. Justice Black, the Borax case, which was de-
cided in 1935,
(1) held that the extent of a federal grant was a federal question;
(2) has never been doubted since; and
(3) was rightly decided in choosing federal law because it dealt
"with waters that lap both the lands of the State and the boundaries
of the international sea. This relationship, at this particular point
of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital interest of the Nation
in its own boundaries to allow it to be governed by any law but the
'supreme Law of the Land'." 10 Beautiful prose, but what does it
mean? No one doubts that the state owns the tidelands. The question
for decision is strictly as to the dividing line between the upland and
the tidelands and not as to the dividing line between the tidelands
and the lands outward from there. So how does the former question
affect the Nation's boundaries? Or is the Court merely lapsing back
to the arguments from the old submerged lands controversy?11
B. The Borax Opinion.
In 1850 California became a state and upon admission it suc-
ceeded to ownership of the land underlying the tide waters. 12 In
(1966) and Note, Pederal Law and Seashore Accretion, 28 L_. L. Rxv. 655 (1968).
While there is some controversy as to whether the Washington Constitutional provision
was really intended to cut off private ownership of future alluvion, the Washington Su-
preme Court so interpreted it and that conclusion will be accepted for the purpose of this
2omment.
9. Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) (Mr. Justice McReynolds dissent-
Ing).
10. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293 (1967).
11. See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954) and United States v. Louisiana, 389
LT.S. 156 (1967).
12. This is generally referred to as coming In on "an equal footing." The Constitu-
tional argument is presented as follows in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
?12, 229 (1845), quoting in part from Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366 (1842):
"When the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves
sovereign; and in that-character hold the absolute right to all their navigable
waters, and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only
to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution.
By the preceding course of reasoning we have arrived at these general con-
clusions: First, the shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them,
were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved
to the States respectively. Secondly, the new states have the same rights,
sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original states. Thirdly,
the right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Con-
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1880 the federal survey was made of the area. In 1881 the federal
government gave a patent to one Banning. If the land in question
was tidelands and, therefore, belonged to California the federal gov-
ernment had no power to convey it to Banning, and thus his succes-
sors, in turn, would have no claim. The United States Supreme Court
held, first, that the Federal Land Department's decision was not
conclusive since its jurisdiction extended only to "public lands of the
United States,"' I3 and here the very question in dispute was as to
the boundary between state and federal lands. Then, since the Court
of Appeals had also determined that the status of the land should
be determined by the District Court on remand, it moved to consider
the correctness of the Appeal's Court instruction that the "mean high
tide line" rather than the "neap tide line" should be used. The
Court appeared to address itself first to the existence of a "federal
question"; but in reality it was deciding the choice of law issue: 14
The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is as
to the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between
the upland and the tideland, is necessarily a federal question.
It is a question which concerns the validity and effect of an
act done by the United States; it involves the ascertainment
of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law. 15
The Court then cited four of its own decisions as authority.'6 It drew
a distinction between this "federal question" and questions as to
"Rights and interests in the tideland, which is subject to the sov-
ereignty of the State, are matters of local law.' '1 7 For this obser-
vation the Court also cited four of its own decisions,'18 but none of
the former four were cited.
C. The Earlier Decisions Cited by the Borax Court to support the
"Federal Question" Language.
(1) The Cases Considered Individually
(a) Packer v. Bird 9
The question to be decided was whether a federal patent con-
gress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition
thereof, confer no power to grant the plaintiff the land in controversy in
this case."
13. Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 17 (1935). In so holding, theCourtdlstn-
guished Knight v. U.S. Land Ass'n., 142 U.S. 161 (1891) which Mr. Justice McReynolds
in dissenting in Boraxy relied upon exclusively. The distinction seems tenable, and since
the case has no particular relevance to Hughes, it will not be detailed.
14. For a more detailed discussion see p. 89 infra.
15. Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles 296 U.S. 10, 22 (1935).
16. "Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669, 670; Brewer-Elliott Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 77, 87; United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55, 56; United States v. Utah,
283 U.S. 64, 75." Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 22.
18. "Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338; Shively v. Bowlby, supra, p. 40, [152 U.S. 1,
10) Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382; Port of Seattle v. Oregon and Washington R.-
..o., 255 U.S. 56, 63." Id. at 22.
19. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
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veyed land to the middle of the Sacramento River in California or
whether the boundary stopped at the river's edge. The area in ques-
tion was above the influence of the tide, but California claimed that
the Sacramento River was still navigable in fact at this point. The
United States Supreme Court decided that it had used the navigable
in fact test rather than the common law test ever since The Genesee
Chief20 to determine navigability. Therefore, California was right,
and the underlying beds properly belonged to the State. If the State
wanted to cede its land to the abutting landowner that was its busi-
ness. Since the Supreme Court agreed with the more liberal Calif-
ornia test for determining navigability there was, of course, no real
confrontation as between federal and state jurisdiction, since the law
of both jurisdictions was therefore the same. And the Packer case
has generally been cited by the United States Supreme Court itself
as showing the controlling nature of local law.21 Further the Packer
Court had quoted extensively from Barney v. Keokuk, 22 one of the
cases cited by the Borax court for the state sovereignty proposition
and from the very same page cited by the Borax court.23 But in
writing for the Packer Court, Mr. Justice Field did say:
The courts of the United States will construe the grants of
the general government without reference to the rules of con-
struction adopted by the States for their grants; but what-
ever incidents or rights attached to the ownership of property
conveyed by the government will be determined by the States,
subject to the condition that their rules do not impair the
efficacy of the grants or the use and enjoyment of the prop-
erty by the grantee. 24
And the Court did suggest that it might look to the state courts as
a whole to find the law in question assuming no clear federal statute
or federal court decision in point. 25
(b) Brewer-Elliott Oil Co. v. United States 2
In this case, the question was whether the oil rich bed under
the Arkansas River belonged to Oklahoma or to the Osage Tribe. If
the River was not navigable it belonged to the Osage; if navigable,
it belonged to Oklahoma. Should Oklahoma law or federal law de-
termine navigability? Federal law said Mr. Justice Taft speaking for
20. The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
21. E.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 383 (1891); Water Power Co. v. Water
Comm'rs., 168 U.S. 349, 362 (1897).
22. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324 (1876).
23. 137 U.S. at 671-672, quoting 94 U.S. at 338.
24. 137 U.S. at 661, 669. However, no citations are given at this point
25. "From the conflicting decisions of the state courts cited, it is evident that there
is no such gcncral law on the subject as wUl be deemed to control their anstruction." Id.
at 670 (Emphasis added).
26. Brewer-Elliott Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
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the entire United States Supreme Court. Several reasons were sug-
gested by his opinion. First, the federal government had not been a
party to the prior Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in question.
2 7
Here it was a party as Trustee for the Osage Tribe. It is clear from
the authority cited, however, that this is a simple matter of res
judicata as to a factual determination. - Second, the federal grant
to the Osage Tribe was made thirty-five years before Oklahoma be-
came a state "and before there were any local tribunals to decide
any such questions. ' '2 If it was non-navigable then, no later rule
of the state of Oklahoma could change that. Finally, the Court said:
"As to such a grant, the judgment of the state court does not bind
us, for the validity and effect of an act done by the United States is
necessarily a federal question." 3 0 But the Court expressly qualifies
this language by referring to the grant as having been made prior
to Oklahoma statehood. And even then, the Court qualified further:
It is true that, where the United States has not in any way
provided otherwise, the ordinary instance attaching to a title
27. Id. at 87.
28. The Court cites two cases: Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922) and Economy
Light and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
In Oklahoma v. Texas the United States Supreme Court said as to the prior
Oklahoma case determining the Red River to be navigable at a particular location:
"A decision by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Hale v. Record, 44 Okla.
803, is relied on as adjudging that the river is navigable in part. The opinion
in the case is briefly to the effect that in the trial court the evidence was
conflicting, that the conflict was there resolved on the side of navigability,
and that this finding had reasonable support in the evidence and therefore
would not be disturbed. It was a purely private litigation. The United States
was not a party and is not bound. There is in the opinion no statement
of the evidence, so the decision hardly can be regarded as persuasive here.
We conclude that no part of the river within Oklahoma Is navigable and
therefore that the title to the bed did not pass to the State on its admission
into the Union." (258 U.S. 574, 591) (footnotes of original text are omitted).
No Oklahoma rule as such has been established that is being rejected by the United
States Supreme Court. The Oklahoma v. Texas Court also cited Economy. The following
language from Economy should make the point as clear as one can:
"Our attention is called to the fact that in People v. Economy Power Co.,
241 Illinois, 290, 320-338, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Des-
plaines in its natural condition is not a navigable stream; and it is intimated
that we ought to follow that decision. A writ of error brought to review it
was dismissed by us because no federal question was involved (234 U.S. 497,
510, 524). Of course, the decision does not render the matter res Judicata,
as the United States was not a party. The District Court In the present
case treated it as not persuasive, because it appeared that evidence was
wanting which was present here; and we cannot say that the court below
erred in not following it." (256 U.S. 113, 123).
29. 260 U.S. at 87-88. "The title of the Indians grows out of a Federal grant
when the Federal Government had complete sovereignty over the territory
in question. Oklahoma, when she came into the Union, took sovereignty over
the public land(s) in the condition of ownership as they were then, and,
If the bed of a non-navigable stream had then become the property of the
Osages, there was nothing in the admission of Oklahoma Into a consti-
tutional equality of power with other States which requires or permitted a
divesting of the title. It is not for a State by courts or legislature, in deal-
ing with the general subject of beds or streams, to adopt a retroactive rule
for determining navigability which would destroy a title already accrued
under federal law and grant in large what actually passed to the State, at
the time of her admission, under the constitutional rule of e4uality here
Invoked."
30. Id. at 87. See note 29 supra.
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traced to a patent of the United States under the public land
laws may be determined according to local rules; but this
is subject to the qualifications that the local rules do not
impair the efficacy of the grant or the use and enjoyment of
the property by the grantee."1
Then the Court again referred to the fact that rights had vested
prior to statehood and that no newly created rule could retroactively
divest them. No such issue of retroactivity existed in the Borax case,
but it did in Hughes.
(c) United States v. Holt Bank32
In this case, the federal government claimed title to the lands
that had formerly been under the bed of Mud Lake in Minnesota."3
The United States Supreme Court determined that if the lake was
navigable, and the bed had not otherwise been disposed of, it passed
to the State of Minnesota in 1858 upon its admission into the Union.
Both lower federal courts had held that the lake was navigable on
the basis that this question was to be determined by local law and
that under the Minnesota rule it was navigable. While agreeing with
this result, the United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Van
Devanter, disagreed as to the test:
We think they applied a wrong standard. Navigability, when
asserted as the basis of a right arising under the Constitution
of the United States, is necessarily a question of federal law
to be determined according to the general rule recognized and
applied in federal courts. 34 To treat the question as turning
on the varying local rules would give the Constitution a diver-
sified operation where uniformity was intended. 5
In referring to the Constitution, Mr. Justice Van Devanter is refer-
ring to "the constitutional principle of equality among the several
states.''3 6 Apparently his argument was that since the states are be-
ing admitted on an equal footing, a new state should not be able to
get a greater ownership of soil underlying waters than the original
states merely by adopting a more expansive navigability test. But
the argument does not seem persuasive in this factual context. First,
the principle was designed to protect the new states not the old states.
31. Id. at 88 (Citing Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669). The court also cited without
disapproving Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891), as cited to in Borax for the second
proposition. The Court futher noted Wear v. Kansas, 245 U.S. 154 (1917), and agreed
in the principle therein set forth while distinguishing it from the present situation.
32. United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1925).
33. Ostensibly as Trustee for the Chippewa Indians.
34. At this point the Court cited the Brewer-Elliott case, which involved a Federal
grant prior to Oklahoma statehood, a factor clearly not involved in the aspect of this
case for which it was cited.
35. 270 U.S. at 55-56. See also note 12 supra.
36. 270 U.S. at 55.
Bee the extensive discussion in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 at 26-31
and note 12 aupra.
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Second, few would deny that if the federal government wanted to
cede ownership of lands underlying non-navigable waters to the new
.states it could do so. Thus it does not seem that any great principle
of uniformity is being either achieved or protected by such a decision.
Further, the rationale of Hughes may well be repugnant to "the con-
stitutional principle." 37
(d) United States v. Utah.3 8
The primary question in this case was as to the ownership of the
beds of several streams in the state of Utah, and this depended on
whether or not the streams were navigable. If navigable, the beds
belonged to Utah; if not navigable, the beds belonged to the federal
government as it had never conveyed them or the abutting land to
anyone. In determining the question of navigability, Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes wrote for the United States Supreme Court as follows:
The question of navigability is thus determinative of the con-
troversy, and that is a federal question. This is so, although
it is undisputed that none of the portions of the rivers under
consideration constitute navigable waters of the United
states, that is, they are not navigable in interstate or foreign
commerce, and the question is whether they are navigable
waters of the State of Utah. State laws cannot affect titles
vested in the United States.3 9
For this last statement the Court cited only the Brewer-Elliott and
Holt Bank cases. But Brewer-Elliott was clearly limited to the sit-
uation where rights had vested prior to Statehood. And the rationale
for Holt Bank had appeared to be the desire for uniformity as among
the states; as such that does not necessarily have anything to do
with whether a title is vested in the United States or not. The opinion
does refer to the "constitutional principle of... equality of States," 40
so that perhaps the uniformity argument is present in this case also.
The Court reviewed the evidence as to whether it supported the
Master's findings under the federal test and held that essentially it
did. The Court made it clear, however, that the primary factor for
finding federal law to control was that the United States claimed own-
ership of the land. This factor did not exist in either Borax or Hughes.
(2) The Cases Considered as a Group
Assuming then that these four cases are cited for the proposition
that federal law controls, they are, in total, weak authority. What-
37. For a more detailed discussion see this text at p. 93.
38. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
39. Id. at 75. The "state laws" in question was an act of the Utah legislature. LAwS)F UTAH at 8 (1927) declaring certain streams in Utah to be navigable.
40. 283 U.S. at 75.
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ever the language of Packer, it has been subsequently cited by the
United States Supreme Court itself as illustrating the applicability of
local law. In Brewer-Elliott the factor emphasized over and over
again by the court was the fact that the grant predated Oklahoma
statehood, a factor not present in Borax. Further, the outright re-
jection of the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision clearly was made
on a res judicata basis. In Holt Bank as in Packer the result was con-
sistent with the state law; Brewer-Elliott was there cited erroneous-
ly. In the Utah case, the Court made it clear that the federal claim
of ownership was the overriding consideration. No such claim was
made in Borax. In fact the federal government was not a party in
Borax while it had been in all of the above cases except Packer. On
the other hand, all four cases dealt with the issue of navigability
which was not in issue in either Borax or Hughes.
D. The Earlier Decisions Cited by the Borax Court to Support the
State Sovereignty Language
(1) The Cases Considered Individually
(a) Barney v. Keokuk 4'
This case presented a question as to the ownership of land abut-
ting the Mississippi River after a street dedication and reclamation
project. The courts held that a common law dedication had taken
place so that the bed underlying the street belonged to the abutting
land owner. The City of Keokuk, Iowa, had filled in a portion of the
Mississippi River adjacent to the street in excess of 200 feet. The
United States Supreme Court pointed out that under Iowa law ripar-
ian ownership extended no further than the ordinary high-water mark,
and that the state owns the shore between high and low water marks,
as well as the bed of the river. This the court found to be the common
law as well, so no controversy existed as to this point, although it is
this point for which the case is generally cited as following local law.4
2
But the Court went on to make it fairly clear that it was up to the state
to determine the ownership of the man-made fill as well.4 3
(b) Hardin v. Jordan44
The question in this case was the location of plaintiff's boundary
in relation to a non-navigable Illinois lake. Plaintiff claimed under a
federal patent. The Court used strong language to indicate that the
decision was to be based on Illinois law:
41. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
42. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 41-42, 45 (1894).43. "It is generally conceded that the riparian title attaches to subsequent accretions
to the land effected by the gradual and imperceptible operation of natural causes. But
whether it attaches to land reclaimed by artificial means from the bed of the river, or to
sudden accretions produced by unusual floods, is a question which each State decides for
itself." 94 U.S. at 337.
44. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
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This question must be decided by some rule of law and no
rule of law can be resorted to for the purpose except the local
law of the State of Illinois.4 5 In our judgment the grants of
the government for lands bounded on streams and other
waters, without any reservation or restriction of terms, are to
be construed as to their effect according to the law of the
State in which the lands lie.4 6
The Court then went on to determine that under the law of Illinois
plaintiff's boundary extended to the center of the lake. Here the
Court got into difficulty, three justices dissenting on the basis that
the Court was ignoring rather than declaring Illinois law. The
dissenters' opinion was that Illinois law would place plaintiff's bound-
ary at the water's edge, and there seemed to be substantial merit
to that view.4 7 The majority's method of determining state law was
somewhat disapproved in at least one later case.48
(c) Shively v. Bowlby49
Plaintiff claimed ownership of land below the high water mark
on the Columbia River in Oregon as a grantee of the State of
Oregon. Defendant counterclaimed alleging title to some of the tide-
lands because of a federal grant of land bounded by the Columbia
River. The state courts held against the defendant on his counter-
claim and then allowed the plaintiff to dismiss his complaint without
prejudice. The United States Supreme Court, first, found the ex-
istence of a federal question:
The judgment against its [the counterclaim's] validity
proceeded upon the ground that the grant from the United
States upon which it was founded passed no title or right,
as against the subsequent deeds from the State, in lands
below high water mark. This is a direct adjudication against
the validity of a right or privilege claimed under a law
of the United States, and presents a Federal question within
the appellate jurisdiction of this court. 50
The argument against finding a federal question was that this
case was just like a private grant construction case, the fact of the
grantor being the federal government not making any difference.
ro this argument, the court gave this interesting answer:
But this is not so. The rule of construction in the case
45. Id. at 380.
46. Id. at 384.
47. The later case of Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903), proves that the dis-
Senters were better attuned to the status of Illinois Law: "The Law of Illinois has been
;ettled since Hardin v. Jordan ... and it is now clear, by the decision in this case and
ater, that conveyances of the upland do not carry adjoining land below the water line."
48. See Water Power Co. v. Water Comm'rs., 168 U.S. 349, 366 (1897).
49. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
50. Id. at 9-10.
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of such a grant from the sovereign is quite different from
that which governs private grants. The familiar rule and its
chief foundation were felicitously expressed by Sir William
Scott: 'All grants of the Crown are to be strictly construed
against the grantee, contrary to the usual policy of the law
in the consideration of grants; and upon this just ground,
that the prerogatives and rights and emoluments of the
Crown being conferred upon it for great purposes, and for
the public use, it shall not be intended that such preroga-
tives, rights and emoluments are diminished by any grant,
beyond what such grant by necessary and unavoidable con-
struction shall take away.' 51
Fortunately this kind of feudalistic notion does not seem to have
prevailed. The Court then went on to deal with the choice of law
question, and its conclusion on this point was as follows:
The later judgments of this Court clearly establish that
the title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the
soil below high water mark of navigable waters are govern-
ed by the local laws of the several States, subject, of course,
to the rights granted to the United States by the Constitution.52
This conclusion took on much greater meaning with the express
recognition by the Court that the results varied from state to state. 53
The Court went through a 58 page analysis of its prior decisions be-
cause it found "such a diversity of view as to the scope and effect
of the previous decisions of this court upon the subject of public
and private rights in lands below high water mark of navigable
waters. . ."5 Because of this review which included over thirty of
its own decisions in varying degrees of detail, it has been frequently
cited and relied upon. 55 What has been clearly determined by this
and other decisions of the United States Supreme Court is that a
state may exercise its ownership over the beds to completely cut
off access by upland owners. In this case the plaintiffs had been
conveyed tidelands by the State of Oregon on which they maintained
a wharf. This prevented access to the water by the defendants but
they were held to have no right to wharf out to the navigable water.
51. Id. at 10, citing "The Rebeckah, 1 C. Rob. 227, 230" (1799).
52. Id. at 40.
53. Id. at 26.
The foregoing summary of the laws of the original States shows that there
is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but that each State has
dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders according to
its own views of Justice and policy, reserving its own control over such
lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether
owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it Considered for the best interest
of the public. Great caution, therefore, is necessary in applying precedents
in one State to cases arising In another.
54. Id. at 10-11.
55. E.g., Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 343 (1906); Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.P.,
255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921) ; Brewer-Elliott Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1922).
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What limits there are or should be on this principle will be discussed
later.5 6
(d) Port of Seattle v. Oregon and W. R. R. 57
In this case the question was whether the Railroad had acquired
in connection with its purchase from the State of lots of filled land
abutting on a waterway, "a private riparian or littoral right to con-
struct wharves, docks and piers on this 125-feet area, in order to
provide for itself, as owner of the land, and for those claiming under
it, convenient access to the fairway for purposes of navigation and
commerce. ' ' 58 This, the Court said, depended on the law of Wash-
ington, since it has "the full proprietary right" in the tidelands.
59
The Court then went on to find that under the law of Washington
the railroad acquired no such right. The Court expressly recognized
that Washington law differed from that of other states on the same
question .60
(2) The Cases Considered as a Group
In these four cases, the court discussed the presence of a federal
question in only one, (the case being appealed from a state court)
although it decided the merits in all. It is not clear whether in the
other three cases federal jurisdiction was based on the existence
of a federal question or on a diversity of citizenship basis. But in all
four the Court was clear that as to choice of law it would apply the
local law. To the extent that the application of local law reflects only
a recognition that the state has the right to relinquish its ownership
of land under navigable waters to the upland owner, it is really not
very significant for such a proposition ought to be self-evident.6 1 But
certainly in Shively and in Port of Seattle the Court goes much be-
yond this in looking to state law to determine riparian or littoral
rights regarding maintaining of access to bodies of water, the very
question before the Court in Hughes. And in none of these four
cases was navigability really in issue whereas in the first four it had
been the primary issue. But in Borax navigability is not the primary
issue either; rather it is whether the "mean high tide line" or "neap
tide line" forms the boundary.
56. Infra this text.
57. Seattle v. Oregon and Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921).
58. Id. at 62.
59. Id. at 63.
60. Id. at 64.
So complete is the absence of riparian or littoral rights that the state
may-subject to the superior rights of the United States-wholly divert a
navigable stream, sell the river bed and yet have impaired in so. doing no
right of the upland owners whose land is thereby separated from all con-
tact with the water.
61. This is the proposition for which Barney has been cited. See Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1 (1894,). For additional cases where the question was simply whether the state
had given up its ownership beyond the highwater mark and where the local determination
was followed see St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226 (1891) and Kaukauna Water Power Co.
v. Green Bay and Miss. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254 (1891).
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E. The Borax Opinion Re-Analyzed.
While it had first appeared that the Borax Court in the quota-
tion above was addressing itself solely to the existence or nonex-
istence of the federal question, it is apparent from the material cited
that it was purporting to address itself to both the federal question
and the choice of law problem, if indeed it had before it the notion
of any jurisdictional problem at all. For example, Shively which
decided that the issue was controlled by local law also decided
there was a federal question. This conclusion about Borax is empha-
sized further by the fact that the court made no specific (or further)
analysis as far as the choice of law question was concerned. It said
merely that it saw no reason to review the California decisions as
to what tidal test they had used and finally concluded: "In determin-
ing the limit of the federal grant, we perceive no justification for
taking neap high tides, or the mean of those tides, as the boundary
between upland and tideland, and for thus excluding from the shore
the land which is actually covered by the tides most of the time." 62
But what the Court was doing in holding to the mean high tide line
was telling California that. if she has been using the neap tide line,
she may have been interpreting the extent of the tidelands acquired
by the State upon accession too narrowly. This is not the result in
Hughes where the Court is restricting the state's control over the
tidelands by giving the riparian owner a "right" to alluvion.
IV. THE CASES SINCE HUGHES
There have been seven court decisions since Hughes that have
referred to the United States Supreme Court opinion.6 3 Two are
lower federal court opinions; four are state supreme court opinions
and one is a state intermediate appellate court opinion.
Three of these seven cases merely refer to the language in
Hughes that states how important access is."' A fourth merely cites
Hughes for the innocuous proposition that legislation cannot divest
a vested right.6 5 The remaining three, however, involve at least
minor attempts to distinguish Hughes. In 1968 the Supreme Court
of Washington wrote of Hughes and the issue then before it:
62. Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
63. United States v. 222.0 Acres of Land, 306 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1969) ; Burns v.
Forbes, 412 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1969) ; Linn Farms, Inc. v. Edlen, 111 Ill. App.2d 294, 250
N.E.2d 681 (1969) ; State ex rel Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Ore. 1969) ; Bach v. Sar-
ich, 445 P.2d 648 (Wash. 1968) ; Anderson v. Olson, 461 P.2d 343 (Wash. 1969) ; Borough
of Wildwood Crest v. Masciarella, 240 A.2d 665 (N.J. 1968).
For comments on Hughes, see 54 A.B.A.J. 192 (1968); Note, Federal Law and Sea-
shore Accretion, 28 LA. L. Exv. 655 (1968).
64. United States v. 222.0 Acres of Land, 306 F. Supp. 138, 151 (D. Md. 1969) ; Burns
v. Forbes, 412 F.2d 995, 998 (3d Cir. 1969) ; Linn Farms Inc. v. Edlen, 111 Ill. App.2d
294, 250 N.E.2d 681, 684-85 (1969).
65. State v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 675 (Ore. 1969).
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Defendants finally argue that under Hughes . . . . the
federal common law controls the result here; and that under
the federal common law the defendants have a right to build
their apartment on a fill on their portion of the lake bed.
This contention is based on the fact that defendants'
title is to upland property and submerged land, and is traced
to an 1872 federal government patent. This patent was is-
sued prior to Washington statehood, and made no reference
to the lake.
In Hughes, supra, the issue presented was whether fed-
eral or state laws govern the ownership of accreted land,
gradually deposited by the ocean on adjoining upland pro-
perty conveyed by the United States to petitioner's pre-
decessor in title prior to Washington statehood. The United
States Supreme Court held that federal law applied, and that
under federal law petitioner was entitled to the accretion
that had gradually formed along her ocean front property.
The Hughes decision is in no way applicable to the in-
stant case. We are not concerned here with the ownership
of land or the extent or validity of title created by a federal
act .
6
In 1969 in a footnote comment, the Washington Supreme Court
said of Hughes:
In Hughes . . ., it was established that the line of ordinary
highwater, with respect to tidelands bounding uplands held
under a pre-statehood patent, was a moving boundary, i.e.,
that the owner of the upland was entitled to accretions by
virtue of a pre-statehood federal patent. See generally
Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin, and to What Extent
Is This a Federal Question?, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 33 (1966). A
fruitful comparison may be made between the Hughes opin-
ion in the U. S. Supreme Court and Professor Corker's com-
ments on the position assumed by the Solicitor General re
a grant of certiorari. Id. at 115.67
In 1968, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had referred to
Hughes:
New Jersey's law of accretion, rather than the federal de-
cisions, is admittedly controlling here. See 43 U.S.C.A. §
1301 et seq.; 1 Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries 115 et
seq. (1962); cf. Hughes .... 61
The New Jersey court was referring to the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953.69
66. Bach v. Sarich, 445 P.2d 648, 653-54 (Wash. 1968).
67. Anderson v. Olson, 461 P.2d 343, 345 N.2 (Wash. 1969).
68. Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Masciarella, 240 A.2d 665, 667 (N.J. 1968).
69. 67 Stat. 29. Cf. note 11, supra.
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V. THE FEDERAL QUESTION AND HUGHES
It is not my initent to delineate what is meant by a "federal
question" when so learned an expert in the area as Professor Wright
has been unable to do so. 7 0 But there are some observations that
do seem appropriate.
The mere fact that a right originated under a federal land law
or federal grant does not mean that a federal question exists.7 1 In
many of the cases so holding, the original grant has not been dis-
puted. At some later time a dispute has arisen between two parties
both making some claim under the original grantee.7 2 In other cases
the Court has said that the question is simply one of fact. Thus in
Sweringen v. St. Louis, the United States Supreme Court dismissed
a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Missouri for want of juris-
diction stating that the validity of the patent involved was not in
question and that it was "a pure question of the construction of the
language used in the patent, whether the land granted therein reach-
ed the waters of the Mississippi River on the east, or whether, ac-
cording to the courses and distances contained in the patent, the
eastern limit of the land conveyed was some hundreds of feet west
of the river. It was really a question of fact as to how far east the
measurements of the courses and distances carried the boundary.
' 7 8
Another example would be where a claim is based on a patent and
the jury finds that no patent exists. This does not deny authority
of the federal government to issue such a patent, it merely denies
the existence of one.7
4
But an opinion that more squarely stands in the way of the
majority rationale in Hughes is cited and relied upon by Mr. Justice
Stewart in his concurring opinion: Joy v. St. Louis.7 5 The majority
disposed of it by ignoring it. Apparently Mr. Justice Stewart relied
on the following conclusion stated by the Court in Joy:
As this land in controversy is not the land described in
the letters patent or the acts of Congress, but, as stated in the
petition, is formed by accretions or gradual deposits from
the river, whether such land belongs to the plaintiff is, under
70. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 48-63 (1963).
71. E.g., Romie v. Casanova, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 379 (1875); McStay v. Friedman, 92
U.S. (2 -Otto) 723 (1875); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 199
(1877) ; Bushnell v. Crooke Mining Co., 148 U.S. 682 (1893); Gillis v. Stinchfield, 159
U.S. 65 (1895) ; Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571 (1900); Florida
Cent. & Peninsular R.R. v. Bell, 176 U.S. 321 (1900) ; Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177
U.S. 505 (1900).
72. E.g., Romie v. Casanova, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 379 (1875); McStay v. Friedman, 99
U.S. (Otto II) 723 (1875).
73. Sweringen v. St. Louis, 185 U.S. 38, 41 (1902).
74. See Mining Co. v. Boggs, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 304 (1865).
75. Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906).
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the cases just cited, a matter of local or state law, and not
one arising under the laws of the United States. 6
But for the fact that an ocean rather than a river is involved in
Hughes, this exact language could have been written in the Hughes
case. The statement was not necessary to the decision in Joy; how-
ever, it probably should be treated as an alternative ground for
decision.
In Joy, the federal circuit court had dismissed the plaintiff's
petition for want of jurisdiction. The dismissal was affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court. The opinioin began by pointing out
that there was no diversity of citizenship. It then went on to deter-
mine whether there was a federal question. The action was one of
ejectment. While the plaintiff in his complaint alleged title based
on a federal patent and acts of Congress, this was unnecessary to
an ejectment action. The Court said that its mere allegation did not
comply with the rule that the existence of the federal question must
appear in the complaint or petition. As the Court pointed out in an
ejectment action the defendant might admit the validity of plain-
tiff's title originally but defend on the ground of adverse possession,
as happened in this case. Then clearly there would be no federal
question. This analysis was sufficient under the then existing law to
dispose of the case, but the Court went on to discuss the alternative
ground quoted above. The Joy Court thought that its alternative
ground was consistent with the Packer case.
Since the issues in the Hughes case could involve a challenge
to the authority of the federal government to vest a right to future
alluvion in a littoral owner prior to the assumption of sovereignty by
a state over tidelands, a federal question would exist. When the
Hughes conveyance was made, as in Brewer-Elliott, there was no
state law on this matter. The case would then be distinguishable from
Joy. 77
76. Id. at 343. Citing Sweringen v. St. Louis, 185 U.S. 38 (1902), Packer v. Bird, 137
U.S. 661 (1891) and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
77. In Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 410 (1891), one of the few land cases in which
the Court specifically addresses itself to the federal question issue and where it was
dealing with removal from a state court to the federal court, it reasoned as follows:
" . . . we think that the additional ground of removal, stated in the amended
petition, was sufficient to authorize the removal to be made. It states very
clearly that the controversy between the parties involved the authority of the
Land Department of the United States to grant the patent or patents under
which the defendant claimed the right to hold the land in dispute after and
in view of the patent under which the plaintiff claimed the same land. This,
if true, certainly exhibited a claim by one party under the authority of the
government of the United States, which was contested by the other party
on the ground of a want of such authority. In the settlement of this con-
troversy, it is true, the laws of the State of Illinois might be invoked by one
party or both; but it would still be no less true that the authority of the
United States to make the grant relied on would necessarily be called in
question. We are, therefore, of opinion that the ground of removal now re-
ferred to presented a case arising under the laws of the United States, and
so within the purview of the act of 1875." See also the language quoted from
the Shively case supra at note 49,
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VI. THE CHOICE OF LAW AND HUGHES
The analysis in this section begins with the following general
proposition:
It is the settled rule in this court that absolute property
in, and dominion and sovereiginty over, the soils under the
tide waters in the original States were reserved to the sev-
eral States, and that the new States since admitted have the
same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction in that behalf as
the original States within their respective borders. 78
Under this general principle it has been recognized that the state
can cut off the access of the upland owner by appropriating the tide-
lands to a use which does so. Thus the United States Supreme Court
has previously sustained the reclamation of tidelands and the use
of the reclaimed land for building lots. 79 These cases are recog-
nized by the Hughes Court and are not disapproved. 0 Thus the con-
clusion would seem to follow that even though land is involved where
title originates from a federal grant, a state has the power to pre-
vent the accumulation of alluvion and to cut off access by use of
its underlying bed.
Query if alluvion to the littoral owner would be cut off by a grant
of tidelands to a private party where the private party had not uti-
lized the granted lands before the accretion occurred. In the only
United States Supreme Court case dealing with the issue, the Court
assumed that the state had no intent to cut it off.81 Thus the Court
never reached the question whether the state had the power to do so.
Since a new state has the same sovereignty over its tidelands
that the original states have, the next question is whether one of the
original states, for example, New Jersey, not formed from the public
domain and thereby having no federal grant to be construed, could
78. Knight v. U.S. Land Ass'n., 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891).
79. Den v. Jersey Co., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 426 (1853); Seattle v. Oregon and Wash.
R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 407 (1903)(In the latter case the United States Supreme Court in interpreting California law said
"in other words the rights granted must be in aid of commerce" after it had just fin-
ished quoting California's court language to the effect that the rights would be granted
if the grant was "not inconsistent with" the public trust which is to promote navigation.)
For other state activity approved by the United States Supreme Court affecting the
upland owners' access to the water see Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366 (1842)(New Jersey allowed a nonriparian owner to possess tidewater land to grow and dredge
oysters) and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (Oregon allowed a nonriparlan to
erect and maintain a wharf on tidelands).
80. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294 n. 3 (1967).
S1. "We presume from this language that in New Jersey as elsewhere by the
common law the right of accretion is not like the permissive right to use land
still under water, but is a right as against the State as well as its grantees,
when as here the grantees have not filled in the land .... We conclude that
the conveyance by the State did not give the defendant a title to land added
by accretion to the complainants' premises, and that it does not matter that
this conveyance was by metes and bounds. The boundaries however indicated
were good until changed by the gradual work of the ocean and then were
modified in accordance with what we believe to be the common law." Per
Mr. Justice Holmes in Stevens v. Arnold, 262 U.S. 266, 270 (1923).
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declare that henceforth all land formed by accretion or reliction
shall belong to the owner of the bed; that is, if you will, henceforth
these lands shall have fixed boundaries. If she may do so, then a new
state admitted with the same rights of sovereignty should be able
to do so. Is the Supreme Court in Hughes, when it denies Washing-
ton this power over its tidelands, saying that New Jersey could not
cut off future alluvion by declaring boundaries to be fixed? If it is
not doing so, its decision is a clear interference with state sover-
eignty unless one argues the only argument left, that the federal
government before Washington became sovereign vested a right in
the littoral owner to future alluvion which could not be cut off by
the state. While it is true that in Borax, the Court had said that prior
to statehood, the federal government merely held the tidelands "in
trust '8 2 for the future states, it is clear that the federal government
had the power to completely dispose of the tidelands before state-
hood.83 If it had the power to convey the whole fee, then it should
have the power to subject the tidelands to rights of future alluvion.
But the troublesome question remains: Why should there be a vested
right to future alluvion?
If a state has barred itself from cutting off future alluvion, that
should not bar a state that has not done so. However, if as a matter
of due process under the federal constitution future alluvion is treat-
ed as a vested property right which may not be divested except
upon payment of just compensation, a different problem exists.
This latter approach is essentially the one argued for by Mr. Justice
Stewart in his concurring opinion in Hughes.8
4
Why might future alluvion be considered so important? The
United States Supreme Court has frequently discussed the subject
of accretion and its importance to the riparian land owner, and it
has suggested several reasons for that importance. In New Orleans
v. United States, it said: "No other rule can be applied on just princi-
ples. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded, is subject to loss,
by the same means which may add to his territory; and as he is with-
out remedy for his loss, in this way, he cannot be held accountable
for his gain."8 5 This reason is reiterated in St. Clair v. Lovingston.86
82. Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1936).
83. Knight v. U.S. Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891). See also Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1894), and United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1925).
84. But the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State
says, or by what it intends, but by what it does. Although the State in
this case made no attempt to take the accreted lands by eminent domain,
it achieved the same result by effecting a retroactive transformation of
private into public property - without paying for the privilege of doing so.
Because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids such
confiscation by a State, no less through its courts than through its legis-
lature, and no less when a taking is unintended than when it is deliberate,
I join in reversing the judgment.
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Mr. Justice Stewart Concurring).
85. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 660, 716 (1836).
86. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
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In the interim however, the Court had recognized another possible
basis: "by others, it is derived from the principle of public policy,
that it is the interest of the community that all land should have an
owner, and most convenient that insensible additions to the shore
should follow the title to the shore itself. '8 7
In Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co. both were recognized, the
Court refusing to choose as between them."" Obviously the latest
reasoning is that found in the Hughes case: ". . . the soundness of
the principle is scarcely open to question. Any other rule would
leave riparian owners continually in danger of losing the access to
water which is often the most valuable feature of their property,
and continually vulnerable to harassing litigation challenging the
location of the original water lines."89
Other reasons have been suggested for awarding alluvion to the
riparian or littoral owner, but it appears that access to water is now
the most important. 90 Another article discusses the nature of future
alluvion and its "vestedness." 91 The concern there was not with
access, however, since the problem then discussed, the mainte-
nance of water levels, would maintain rather than eliminate access.
The conclusion was that perhaps access was no longer a primary
reason for awarding alluvion but was merely secondary to maintain-
ing rights of "navigation, boating, fishing and the like, ' ' 2 and that
since access was being maintained there was no need to say that
the riparian owner had a vested right to future alluvion. If one wants
to argue that he has a vested right to access, akin to access on a
highway, that is another matter. Awarding of alluvion is only a
means to an end or as stated in this earlier article: "Accretion and
reliction would then become rights at a third level, secondary to the
secondary right of access.'' 93
There were several earlier cases dealing with wharfing out that
made the Supreme Court look like it was trying to establish some
such right that it would be forcing on the states.9 4 However, these
cases were later expressly qualified by the Court.9 5
It is true that in most, if not all, of the decisions applying local
law, the Court qualified the general statement about applicability
of local law with language to the effect that this was true as long as
87. Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 67 (1864).
88. Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 191 (1889).
89. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1967).
90. See the discussion in Beck, The Wandering Missouri River: A Study in Accretion
Law, 43 N.D. L. REV. 429, 431-439 (1967).
91. Beck, Govern ental Refilling of Lakes and Ponds and the Artificial Maintenance
of Water Levels: Must Just Compensation Be Paid to Abutting Landowners?, 46 TRx L.
Rzv. 180, 193-199 (1967).
92. Id. at 196.
93. Id.
94. Dutton v. Strong, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 23 (1861); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 497 (1870). See also RR. Co. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1868).
95. Shlvely v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 34-40 (1894).
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it did not impair the efficacy of the grant or the use and enjoyment
of the granted property. In St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v.
Board of Water Comm'rs, the United States Supreme Court spe-
cifically noted why freedom in the state to declare what riparian
rights an upland owner may have in lands underlying navigable
waters was not affected by these earlier qualifications:
It does not impair the efficacy of the grant or the use
and enjoyment of the property by the grantee to hold that
riparian rights are to be decided by the state courts, inas-
much as the grant, if by the Federal Government, has been
held in the cases already cited, not to include title over navi-
gable waters within or bounded by the States.98
Thus, again, the sovereignty argument is brought to the fore.
Another point that seemed fairly clear was that as to the ques-
tion whether a federal grant carried with it the bed underlying non-
navigable waters, local law would be determinative. At least the
United States Supreme Court had said so frequently enough. In 1921,
in Oklahoma v. Texas, the Court per Mr. Justice Van Devanter,
summed up the earlier decisions very well:
Where the United States owns the bed of a nonnavigable
stream and the upland on one or both sides, it, of course,
is free when disposing of the upland to retain all or any part
of the river bed; and whether in any particular instance
it has done so is essentially a question of what is intended.
If by a treaty or statute or the terms of its patent it has shown
that it intended to restrict the conveyance to the upland or
to that and a part only of the river bed, that intention will
be controlling; and, if its intention be not otherwise shown,
it will be taken to have assented that its conveyance should
be construed and given effect in this particular according
to the law of the State in which the land lies.9 7
The Court there held that the Oklahoma rule was the same as
the common law rule extending title of the riparian owner to the
middle of the nonnavigable stream.
Probably no language could have been more crystal clear than
the earlier language of Mr. Justice Holmes in 1903 in Hardin v.
Shedd:
. . . it has become established almost without argument
that in the former case (nonnavigable waters) as in the latter
96. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs., 168 U.S. 349, 363
(1897).
97. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594-595 (1922). Here the Court cited Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 384; Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 413-414; Grand Rapids and
Indlana R.R. Co. v. Butler, 159 U.S. 87, 92; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519; Whltaker
v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 512, 515-516. See also Kean v. Calumet Canal Co., 190 U.S. 452
(1908).
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(navigable waters) the effect of the grant on the title to ad-
joining submerged land will be determined by the law of the
State where the land lies. In the case of land bounded on
a nonnavigable lake the United States assumes the position
of a private owner subject to the general law of the State,
so far as its conveyances are concerned.9 8
However, a substantial qualification upon this approach was in-
terjected as a result of the opinion in 1935 in United States v. Ore-
gon,9 1 although it must be remembered that this latter case does not
involve a contest between the state and riparian owners, but be-
tween the federal government and the state. This decision came in
the same year as Borax so that perhaps we were witnessing a
change in the Court's philosophy. The Court used strong language:
The laws of the United States alone control the disposition
of title to its lands. The States are powerless to place
any limitation or restriction on that control. The construc-
tion of grants by the United States is a federal not a state
question, and involves the consideration of state questions
only insofar as it may-be determined as a matter of federal
law that the United States has impliedly adopted and as-
sented to a state rule of construction as applicable to its
conveyances. In construing a conveyance by the United
States of land within a State, the settled and reasonable rule
of construction of the State affords an obvious guide in deter-
mining what impliedly passes to the grantee as an incident
to land expressly granted. But no such question is presented
here, for there is no basis for implying any intention to con-
vey title to the State.1"'
The Court here was considering the argument that when the fed-
eral government gave a patent to riparian land on nonnavigable
waters, the title to the land underlying the water inured to the state,
rather than going to the riparian owner or remaining with the fed-
eral government. The argument was rejected. The case was, how-
ever, therefore distinguishable from the earlier case and granted
that these lands were underlying nonnavigable waters and there-
fore did not belong to the state, it can be questioned whether this
decision interfered in any appreciable way with state sovereignty.
On the basis of the sovereignty rationale the Court could be more
solicitous of federal law in relation to riparian owners on non-
navigable waters than in relation to riparian owners on navigable
waters. That it has seemed to be the other way, is an interesting
commentary on its attitude toward the question of sovereignty.
If the Supreme Court of the United States continues its involve-
98. Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903).
99. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
100. Id. at 27-28.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ment with accretion, how far will it go? In 1903 the Supreme Court
of Missouri decided that when nonriparian land came to abut on the
water's edge because the intervening land had eroded away, the
newly abutting land became riparian. 1 Thus when the water re-
ceded and bared the old eroded away land, it now belonged to the
newly abutting tract owner and not to the old tract owner. In 1965 on
the same basic facts, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held to
the contrary. 0 2 May the United States Supreme Court decide who
is right by applying a federal common law, simply because one or
more of the tracts in each case may have originated with a fed-
eral grant? Should it do so?
It is this writer's belief that there is no need for uniformity in
this area, that there is little that is more local in nature than real
property. This was, of course, expressed in the diversity of citizen-
ship choice of law cases as early as Swift v. Tyson itself, where Mr.
Justice Story specifically said that his general common law was
not to apply "to rights and titles to things having a permanent
locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate .. ."10 If the
United States Supreme Court is concerned that private property
rights may be invaded by the states, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment offers an ample control device.
Consequently, the Hughes case should be limited in its inter-
pretation to the situation where there is a federal grant prior to
statehood and involving tidelands. The facts warrant this conclus-
ion. The prior authorities warrant this conclusion. And sound policy
considerations warrant this conclusion.104
101. Widdecombe v. Chiles, 73 S.W. 444 (Mo. 1903).
102. Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965).
103. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1842).
104. For further discussion and for an article that the United States Supreme Court
should have read before deciding Hughes, but apparently did not, see Corker, Where Doea
the Beach Begin, And to What Extent I& ThWs A Federal Question, 42 WASH. L. REV. 83
(1966).
